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Relationship Between International Trade Law and
National Tax Policy: Case Study of China
Associate Prof. Jinyan Li*
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Canada

The international tax literature recently began to address
the relationship between trade law and tax law.7 Some
scholars have suggested a WTO-type multilateral agreement on taxes to address the problems that cannot be dealt
with in bilateral tax treaties, such as international tax competition;8 others have examined the tax implications of
trade law.9 This article draws from this literature and uses
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1. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, international trade law as embodied in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and subsequently the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement directly affects the taxes imposed on goods (such as
tariffs and sales taxes), but not the taxes on income.1
Income taxes are covered by bilateral tax treaties. Tax
treaties are negotiated by “tax people” and trade agreements by “trade people”. “One of the baffling aspects of
international commerce is the wall that separates taxation
and trade.”2
In recent years, it has become clear that the distinction
between trade law and tax law is blurring. “The two tracks
– tax and trade – have come to the end of their utility.”3
Some even think that “[e]very tax solution causes trade
problems, and every trade solution has tax problems”.4
Two recent events also highlight the interaction between
trade law and tax law: (a) the decision of the WTO Appellate Body that the US foreign sales corporation (FSC)
rules and the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income
Exclusion Act violated the WTO principles,5 and (b)
China’s commitment to adjust its tax policy in order to
gain accession to the WTO.6

*
© Jinyan Li, 2005.
1. Johnson, Jon R., International Trade Law (1998), at 274.
2. Rosenbloom, H. David, “Commentary: What’s Trade Got To Do With
It?”, 49 Tax Law Review 593 (1994).
3. Field, Tom and Chuck Gnaedinger, “WTO Compliance May Spur FarReaching Tax Reform”, Tax Notes International, 16 December 2002, at 1103,
quoting Matthew Slaughter.
4. Id., quoting Homer Moyer.
5. The history of the case is summarized in 3.4. There are numerous reports
by the WTO regarding this case; see www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
distabase_wto_members4_e.htm. The most recent report is United States – Tax
Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations – Recourse by the European Communities to Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement and Article 22.7 of the DSU,
WT/DS108/26, 25 April 2003 (03-2225), which contains a brief review of the
history of the case. For more discussion of this case, see Petersmann, ErnstUlrich, “Prevention and Settlement of International Trade Disputes Between the
European Union and the United States”, 8 Tulane Journal of International &
Comparative Law 233 (2000); Goulder, Robert, “WTO Rejects US Appeal
Regarding FSC Regime”, Tax Notes International, 6 March 2000, at 1944;
Clark, Hunter R., Amy Bogran and Hayley Hanson, “The WTO Ruling on Foreign Sales Corporations: Costliest Battle Yet in an Escalating Trade War
Between the United States and the European Union?”, 10 Minnesota Journal of
Global Trade 291 (2001); and Minella, Nicholas J., “Motives and Consequences
of the FSC Dispute: Recent Salvo in a Long Standing Trade War or Fashioning
a Bargaining Chip?”, 27 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1065 (2002).
6. For more discussion of China’s accession to the WTO and the tax implications, see Wong, Cassie and Jim Chung, “WTO Accession Propels Chinese Tax
Reform”, Tax Notes International, 5 February 2001, at 667; Ip, Joanna, “China’s
WTO Accession to Change Environment for Taxes”, Tax Notes International,
13 August 2001, at 790; Li, Jinyan, “WTO and China’s Tax Policy”, Tax Notes
International, 29 May 2000, at 2451; and Tsoi, Alan, “A Look at WTO Impact
on China’s Tax System”, Tax Notes International, 3 July 2000, at 71.
7. See e.g. Avi-Yonah, Reuven, “Treating Tax Issues Through Trade
Regimes”, 26 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1683 (2001); Green,
Robert M., “Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Between Governments: A Comparison of the International Tax and Trade Regimes”, 23 Yale
Journal of International Law 79 (1998); Clark, Bogran and Hanson, supra
note 5; McDaniel, Paul, “The Pursuit of National Tax Policies in a Globalized
Environment: Principal Paper: Trade and Taxation”, 26 Brooklyn Journal of
International Law 1621 (2001); Oyola, Jose, “Foreign Sales Corporation
Beneficiaries: A Profile”, Tax Notes International, 11 August 2000, at 157; and
Warren, Jr., Alvin, “Income Tax Discrimination Against International Commerce”, 54 Tax Law Review 131 (2001).
8. See Thuronyi, Victor, “International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral
Treaty”, 26 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1641 (2001); Ring, D.,
“Prospects for a Multilateral Tax Treaty”, id. at 1699; Avi-Yonah, Reuven S.,
“Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare
State”, 113 Harvard Law Review 1575 (2000), at 1675 (“a multilateral solution
[to the issue of tax competition] ... is therefore essential if the fundamental goals
of taxation are to be preserved”); and Avi-Yonah, supra note 7.
9. See e.g. Arnold, Brian J. and Neil Harris, “NAFTA and the Taxation of
Corporate Investment: A View from Within NAFTA”, 49 Tax Law Review 529
(1994); and Easson, Alex, Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment (2004),
at 200-207.
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China’s accession to the WTO as a case study to discuss
the relationship between international trade law and
national tax policy.
The article first reviews China’s pursuit of joining the
international trade system after several decades of economic and political isolation from the West. The article
next considers the key aspects of the WTO system – the
WTO agreements, the general principles and the dispute
settlement procedures – and then discusses the salient
aspects of China’s tax policy which may conflict with the
WTO rules. Finally, the article analyses the tax policy
implications of China’s accession to the WTO. The main
thesis is that, although the WTO rules may override
domestic tax policies in certain cases, the extent of the
constraints is modest. China remains more or less free to
pursue its own tax policies.
2. CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE WTO
China became a member of the WTO on 11 December
2001. It was a celebrated event in China, and a happy
result of a five-year long march towards rejoining the
world trading community. China was one of the 23 original signatories of the GATT in 1948. At that time, the
Communist Party was fighting to overthrow the Nationalist government. In 1949, the Communists won and formed
a government in Beijing; the Nationalists fled to Taiwan.
While in power, the Nationalist government announced
that China would leave the GATT system. The new Beijing government never recognized the decision to withdraw, but it did not notify the GATT Secretariat of its wish
to resume its status as a member of the GATT until 1986.10
After the WTO was created, China applied to become a
member in 1995.
From 1949 to 1986, there was little political or economic
motivation for China to be part of the GATT system.
China’s economy was based on central planning. China
traded mostly with other socialist countries, and its trade
with Western (GATT member) countries was virtually
non-existent. The economic reform in China increased its
economic relations with Western countries. Rejoining the
GATT was considered important to furthering such relations.11 From 1986 to 1998, China’s international trade
more than quadrupled in value. In 1998, China was the
world’s ninth largest exporter and eleventh largest
importer,12 and exports from China accounted for 3.4% of
the world’s total. China was also one of the world’s largest
recipients of foreign direct investment.13
In order to gain accession to the WTO, China made significant concessions during its negotiations with the WTO.
For example, the average tariff (excluding agricultural
products) was reduced from 42.7% in 1992 to 15% in
2000. It is to be further reduced to 10% by 2005.14 Nontariff measures were reduced from 1,247 in 1992 to fewer
than 400 in 1998.15 China established a timetable to eliminate all non-tariff measures that are inconsistent with the
WTO rules.
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3. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
3.1. Rules-based system
The WTO, with 147 members and more than 30 applicants
for membership (as of July 2004), includes almost all of
the world’s important trading nations.16 It was established
pursuant to the Marrakesh Agreement of 1994 (WTO
Agreement), which concluded the Uruguay Round negotiations.17 The creation of the WTO completed the unfinished business of establishing an institutional structure for
the international trading system.18 The significance of the
WTO cannot be overestimated.19
The WTO Agreement is an umbrella agreement. It sets
out, in four annexes, a series of agreements,20 notably the
GATT and the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS),21 and understandings which contain the substantive obligations of the member countries. The agreements
that may affect domestic tax policy are summarized below.
(a) The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(Annex 1A) incorporated the rules of the GATT 1947.
These rules apply principally to customs duties and procedures and, to a lesser extent, to indirect taxes. The objective of the GATT is to liberalize trade among its members through the non-discrimination principle and the
reduction of barriers.
(b) The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (SCM Agreement) is one of 12 agreements that
10. A Working Party of the WTO examined China’s request to resume its
membership in the GATT 1947 and China’s application to join the WTO in
1995. See WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China,
WT/MIN(01)/31, 10 November 2001 (01-5314), Ministerial Conference, Fourth
Session, Doha, 9-13 November 2001.
11. In statements to the Working Party on the Accession of China, China stated
that its consistent efforts to resume its status as a member of the GATT and to
join the WTO were in line with its objective of reforming the economy to establish a socialist market economy and its basic national policy of opening up to the
outside world. Id., Para. 4.
12. Id., Para. 7.
13. United Nations, World Investment Report (1999).
14. Feng, Ling, “A Discussion of Several Issues concerning the Reform of
China’s Tariff System”, [1998] International Taxation in China, No. 12 at 16 (in
Chinese).
15. Id.
16. For more information about the WTO, see the WTO’s web site:
www.wto.org.
17. The text of this agreement and other WTO agreements is found in 33 International Legal Materials 44 (1994) and on the WTO’s web site (see note 16,
supra).
18. The WTO is the third incarnation of an international organization to regulate the international trading system. The original concept, the International
Trade Organization, was developed in the original GATT 1947. Throughout the
Uruguay Round, the proposed international organization was referred to as the
“Multilateral Trade Organization”. “Multilateral” was replaced by “World” at
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. See Lowenfeld, Andreas F., “Remedies
Along With Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT”, 88 American
Journal of International Law 477 (1994), at 478.
19. Johnson, supra note 1, at 12.
20. Some important Uruguay Round agreements are included in Annex 1 to the
WTO Agreement. They include the GATT 1994, the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures (TRIMS), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
and the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes.
21. See notes 17 and 20, supra.
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further elaborate on or clarify the GATT 1994. The SCM
Agreement expands upon and clarifies the obligations of
the member countries with respect to subsidies and creates
a comprehensive code regarding the application of countervailing duties (see 3.3.).
(c) The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, also known as the “Dispute
Settlement Understanding” (DSU), sets out the procedures
for resolving disputes under the WTO and establishes the
Dispute Settlement Body22 to administer the procedures
(see 3.4.).
The WTO’s objective is to establish a rules-based international trading system. Two important rules are the nondiscrimination principle and the principle against export
subsidies.
3.2. National treatment principle
The non-discrimination principle forms the basis of the
WTO system. The non-discrimination principle consists
of two further principles, the most-favoured-nation (MFN)
principle and the national treatment principle. Under the
MFN principle, products and services originating in the
member countries must be treated alike (e.g. GATT, Art.
I). Under the national treatment principle, once import
duties have been paid, imported goods and services must
be treated no less favourably than domestic products and
services (e.g. GATT, Art. III).
The national treatment principle requires that the member
countries not impose internal taxes or adopt other measures to protect domestic production (GATT, Arts. III.1 and
III.2). The taxes most obviously affected by this principle
are indirect taxes, such as excise taxes, the value added tax
(VAT), and sales taxes imposed on imported goods. These
taxes may not exceed those imposed on similar domestic
products or be applied in such a way as to provide protection to domestic production. As discussed below (see
5.2.), the national treatment principle is the principle on
which the United States relied in its complaint against
China concerning China’s VAT rebate policy for domestically produced semiconductors.

refunds are clearly “subsidies” for purposes of the SCM
Agreement.24
The SCM Agreement classifies subsidies as prohibited
subsidies, actionable subsidies, and non-actionable subsidies:
– Art. 3.1 of the SCM Agreement provides that, with the
exception of agricultural products, prohibited subsidies
are “(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether
solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export
performance ...; (b) subsidies contingent, whether solely
or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of
domestic over imported goods”. To be prohibited, a subsidy must be “specific”. Art. 2 of the SCM Agreement provides that a subsidy is specific to an enterprise or a group
of enterprises or industries if access to it is limited to certain enterprises or to certain enterprises within a designated geographical region.
– Actionable subsidies are those that cause injury to the
domestic industry of another member country, nullify or
impair the benefits of the GATT 1994, or cause serious
prejudice to the interests of another member country.
– Subsidies are non-actionable if they are given for certain purposes that are recognized as legitimate, such as
regional aid, environmental protection, or (within certain
limits) the promotion of research and development.
The key word in Art. 3.1 is “contingent”. The Appellate
Body interpreted this word in the US FSC case25 to mean
“conditional” or “dependent for its existence on something
else”. It stated in Para. 111 of its decision:
In other words, the grant of the subsidy must be conditional
or dependent upon export performance. Footnote 4 of the
SCM Agreement, attached to Article 3.1(a), describes the
relationship of contingency by stating that the grant of a
subsidy must be “tied to“ export performance. Article 3.1(a)
further provides that such export contingency may be the
“sole” condition governing the grant of a prohibited subsidy
or it may be “one of several other conditions”.

The contingency upon export performance may be in law
or in fact. The Appellate Body interpreted “contingency in
law” in Para. 112 as follows:
[A] subsidy is contingent “in law” upon export performance
when the existence of that condition can be demonstrated on
the basis of the very words of the relevant legislation, regulation or other legal instrument constituting the measure. ...
For a subsidy to be de jure export contingent, the underlying
legal instrument does not always have to provide expressis

3.3. Principle against export subsidies
In general, subsidies become a trade problem when they
enable domestic producers to compete unfairly in foreign
markets. Export subsidies have caused serious distortions
in the world trade in agricultural goods.23 Art. XVI of the
GATT 1994 prohibits export subsidies other than those for
primary products and provides for consultations if the subsidization practices of a member country seriously prejudice the interests of another member country.
The SCM Agreement sets out explicit rules on subsidies.
Art. 1 defines “subsidy” as a “financial contribution by a
government or any public body within the territory of a
Member ... [whereby] ... government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected ... and a benefit is
thereby conferred”. Tax reductions, exemptions and

79

22. For more discussion on the Appellate Body, see Bacchus, James, “Around
the Table of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization”, 35 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1021 (2002).
23. Johnson, supra note 1, at 9.
24. For the Appellate Body’s interpretation of this term, see WTO, Report of
the Appellate Body, United States – Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations, WT/DS108/AB/R, 24 February 2000 (00-0675), Para. 15: “In our view,
the ‘foregoing’ of revenue ‘otherwise due’ implies that less revenue has been
raised by the government than would have been raised in a different situation, or,
that is, ‘otherwise’. Moreover, the word ‘foregone’ suggests that the government
has given up an entitlement to raise revenue that it could ‘otherwise’ have
raised.”
25. WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, United States – Tax Treatment for
“Foreign Sales Corporations” – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the
European Communities, WT/DS108AB/RW, AB-2001-8, 14 January 2002 (020152).

© 2005 IBFD

80

BULLETIN

verbis that the subsidy is available only upon fulfillment of
the condition of export performance. Such conditionality
can also be derived by necessary implication from the words
actually used in the measure.

The standard for determining whether subsidies are in fact
contingent upon export performance is met when the facts
demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, without being
made legally contingent upon export performance, is in
fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings (SCM Agreement, footnote 4).
Some of China’s tax incentives may constitute discriminatory measures or prohibited export subsidies. As a member of the WTO, China is bound by the WTO rules, and it
may be challenged by other countries if it violates the
rules. The mechanism for settling trade disputes is discussed briefly below.
3.4. Dispute settlement process
While the GATT 1994 and other multilateral trade agreements are important for their substantive provisions on
international trade, the agreements ultimately rely on the
dispute settlement process to regulate compliance.26
Through the procedures set out in the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, countries seek to ensure compliance with
the obligations established by the agreements.
The DSU prohibits the member countries from unilaterally
determining that obligations under a WTO agreement
have been violated or that benefits under the agreement
have been nullified or impaired. Only the governments of
the member countries have standing under these procedures. Private individuals and organizations have no standing even though their interests may be directly affected by
the resolution of the dispute.
According to the DSU, the settlement of a dispute begins
with a request for consultations. The usual time limit for
consultations is 60 days. If a dispute is not resolved
through consultations, the complaining party may request
a three-person panel to adjudicate the case. The panel’s
decision may be appealed by the parties to the WTO
Appellate Body, a permanent institution established by the
Dispute Settlement Body. The appeal is limited to the
issues of law in the panel’s report and the legal interpretations developed by the panel.
If a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure
is inconsistent with a WTO agreement, it will recommend
that the country that lost the case bring the measure into
conformity with the agreement, and it may suggest ways
for doing so. If the recommendations are not implemented
within a reasonable period of time, the Dispute Settlement
Body can authorize the suspension of concessions or other
obligations to implement its rulings.27 In some cases, in the
event of prolonged non-compliance by the losing/defendant country, the winning/plaintiff country will receive
automatic authorization to retaliate by imposing trade
sanctions.
These procedures and their operation can be seen from the
US FSC case brought by the European Union.28 FSCs are
foreign subsidiaries of US corporations that export US

FEBRUARY 2005

products to world markets. Qualifying FSC income was
effectively exempt from US tax. Most FSCs are based in
tax havens so that FSC income is subject to no or low taxation in the FSC’s residence country. Approximately 7,000
US companies formed FSCs to take advantage of these
and other tax incentives and, by the US Treasury’s estimate, the FSC regime helped these companies save more
than USD 4 billion a year in taxes.29
The European Union followed the procedures required by
the DSU and filed a complaint. It claimed that the FSC
rules put European businesses at a competitive disadvantage by allowing US exporters to profit from “shell firms
set up as offshore paper subsidiaries”30 in tax havens such
as Barbados, Guam and the Virgin Islands.31 The European
Union argued that the tax relief given to FSCs constituted
illegal export subsidies. On 8 October 1999, a WTO panel
ruled in favour of the European Union and called on the
United States to repeal or modify the FSC rules by 1 October 2000.32 The United States appealed the panel’s decision to the Appellate Body; it upheld the panel’s decision
on 24 February 2000.33
In response to the WTO rulings, the US Congress passed
the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion
Act, which was signed into law on 15 November 2000
(Public Law No. 106-519). On 29 January 2002, the Dispute Settlement Body adopted the reports of the panel and
the Appellate Body declaring that the FSC Repeal and
Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act violated Arts. 3.1(a)
and 4.7 of the SCM Agreement.34 The EU was authorized

26. For more information on the dispute settlement process, see www.
wto.org/wto/dispute/dsu.htm. For comments on the dispute settlement process,
see Green, supra note 7; Aceves, William J., “Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements”, 19 Fordham International Law Journal 427 (1995); Dunoff, Jeffrey L., “The WTO’s Legitimacy Crisis: Reflections
on the Law and Politics of WTO Dispute Resolution”, 13 American Review of
International Arbitration 197 (2002); Petersmann, supra note 5; and Schaefer,
Matthew, “Sovereignty, Influence, Realpolitik and the World Trade Organization”, 25 Hastings International & Comparative Law Review 341 (2002).
27. For more discussion of the enforcement mechanism, see Pauwelyn, Joost,
“Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules Are Rules – Toward a
More Collective Approach”, 94 American Journal of International Law 335
(2000).
28. For the US FSC case, see note 5, supra. European dismay over US tax
breaks dates back at least a quarter of a century. In 1972, for example, the European Community charged in a complaint under the GATT 1947 that the US tax
laws permitting exporters to defer tax on a portion of their export earnings violated the GATT prohibition on export subsidies. The legislation that created
FSCs was “enacted as part of the bilateral settlement in 1981 of [the] GATT
complaint filed by the EC against a predecessor U.S. tax provision”. Clark,
Bogran and Hanson, supra note 5, at 292.
29. Id.
30. “EU/US: Americans Contest EU Demand for USD 4 Billion Sanctions”,
Eur. Rep., 2 December 2000, at 2000 (West Law 24320190).
31. See Winestock, Geoff, “EU Aims for Huge Sanctions on the U.S.”, The
Wall Street Journal, 20 November 2000, at A2; and Meller, Paul, “Europeans
Seek $ 4 Billion in Trade Sanctions Against U.S.”, The New York Times, 18
November 2000, at C1.
32. WTO, United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” –
Report of the Panel, WT/DS108/R, 8 October 1999, Document No. 99-4118,
Para. 7.35.
33. See note 24, supra.
34. The Appellate Body held that the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income
Exclusion Act constituted a prohibited export subsidy because it granted a tax
exemption with respect to products produced in the United States which were
intended for use outside the United States (i.e. the tax exemption was contingent
in law upon export performance). See note 25, supra.
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to impose trade sanctions, up to USD 4 billion per year,
against the United States, and the US was given until early
2004 to enact new, WTO-compliant, legislation.35
US lawmakers were slow to enact new legislation to avert
the sanctions. In June 2004, the US Congress approved a
bill to replace the “extraterritorial income exclusion”
regime with a mix of international tax changes and tax cuts
for domestic manufacturers and multinational corporations.36 In October 2004, the United States finally enacted
the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 which, among
other things, repealed the extraterritorial income exclusion
regime.
The FSC case is important not only because of its impact
on US tax policy but also because of its implications for
the relationship between the WTO rules and domestic tax
policy. As explained below, certain aspects of China’s tax
policy can be challenged under the WTO rules.
4. CHINA’S TAX POLICY
4.1. General tax structure and policy
Tax policy has been an important instrument for the government in implementing a two-pronged reform: opening
China up to the outside world and reforming its domestic
economic system.37 A two-track tax system was introduced in the early 1980s: a Western-style tax system for
foreign-owned firms and foreign individuals and another
system for Chinese-owned firms and Chinese citizens.
The two tracks merged over the years in the areas of the
individual income tax, VAT, and other indirect taxes (the
business tax and the consumption tax). The two-track system, however, still exists with respect to the enterprise
income tax: enterprises with foreign investment are subject to the Foreign Enterprise Income Tax (FEIT) Law,38
and domestic enterprises are subject to the Domestic
Enterprise Income Tax (DEIT) Law.39
One of China’s key tax policy objectives is to be internationally competitive. This has been accomplished by:
(a) adopting tax rates that are competitive with those in
neighbouring Asian countries;40 (b) granting various tax
incentives to promote investment in designated areas or
industries; (c) concluding bilateral tax treaties with trading
partners to enable investors from these countries to avoid
international double taxation; and (d) adopting international tax norms such as the arm’s length principle. Tax
incentives are used liberally, despite the absence of empirical research/data showing their effect on foreign direct
investment in China.41
In terms of revenue, the most important taxes are the indirect taxes. In 2003, of the total tax revenues, indirect
taxes accounted for 55%; the enterprise income taxes
accounted for about 15% and the individual income tax for
about 7%.42 As to potential conflicts with the WTO principles, VAT and the FEIT are the most important as they
contain numerous tax incentives that may contravene the
WTO rules.

81

4.2. Value added tax
China’s VAT43 is similar to the VAT in other countries.
Owing to the difficulties in adopting a broad-based VAT
on the supplies of all goods and services, China’s VAT is
imposed mainly on goods and selected services (other services are taxed under the business tax). China’s VAT also
exempts certain goods, including agricultural products and
contraceptive medicines.
VAT is imposed on the value added by each taxpayer at the
stages of manufacturing, distribution, import and export.
This is achieved by charging VAT on the full value of the
supplies made by taxpayers, but allowing taxpayers a
credit for the taxes paid on the goods used in supplying
taxable goods and services. Unlike the consumption-type
VAT adopted by many countries, China’s VAT is a production-type VAT because the input credit is not available
with respect to the cost of acquiring fixed assets, including
machinery, transport vehicles, equipment, instruments,
appliances with a useful life of more than one year, and
goods worth CNY 2,000 or more with a useful life of more
than two years. The rationale for denying an input credit
with respect to fixed assets is to control the perceived
excessive demand for capital investment by enterprises.44
The standard VAT rate is 17%. A lower rate of 13%
applies to sales and imports of certain necessities (grain
and edible oil, running water, hot water, gas, residential
coal products, and air conditioning), print publications,
and agricultural-related products (feed, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, farm machinery and agricultural plastic
film). Exports are taxed at a zero rate.
The significance of zero-rating is that the input VAT is
creditable even though no output VAT is charged. In principle, where the final product is zero-rated, all the VAT
charged at the interim stages in the production chain is
effectively refunded. In practice, however, due to fiscal
and other concerns, the rates of the export rebate have
been reduced many times in China. The current rebate
rates are: 17% for selected machinery, equipment and

35. See note 5, supra.
36. See Glenn, Heidi, “House-Passed ETI Repeal Bill Sets Stage for Difficult
Conference”, Tax Notes International, 28 June 2004, at 1403.
37. See Li, Jinyan, Taxation in the People’s Republic of China (New York:
Praeger, 1991), Chap. 1.
38. Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning ForeignInvestment Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises (FEIT Law), adopted by the
National People’s Congress on 9 April 1991; Detailed Regulations for the
Implementation of the FEIT Law, promulgated by the State Council on 30
June 1991.
39. Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Enterprise
Income Tax, promulgated by the State Council on 14 December 1993.
40. Li, Jinyan, International Taxation in the Age of Electronic Commerce: A
Comparative Study (2003), at 208-209.
41. Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, supra note 10,
Annex IA (Information to be provided by China).
42. The data is published on the web site of the State Administration of Taxation (SAT): www.chinatax.gov.cn/data.jsp.
43. Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Value
Added Tax (VAT Law), adopted by the State Council on 26 November 1993;
Implementing Regulations for the Provisional Regulations of the VAT Law,
issued by the Ministry of Finance on 25 December 1993.
44. Yang, Bin, “China’s VAT: Difficulties With Further Reform and Proposed
Solutions”, Tax Notes International, 6 November 2000, at 2183.
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ships; 13% for selected agricultural products, such as corn
flour and frozen duck meat; 8% for selected minerals; and
5% for other mineral products.45 Therefore, except where
the rebate rate is 17%, exporters bear various levels of
VAT. This policy is obviously not designed to stimulate,
let alone subsidize, exports.46
To encourage the domestic production of certain goods, a
special VAT rebate applies in certain circumstances. For
example, purchasers of domestically produced cotton and
steel receive a VAT rebate.47 Foreign-investment enterprises that purchase Chinese-made equipment to be used
in certain preferred investment projects also qualify for the
VAT rebate, although, under the normal input credit rules,
the VAT paid in respect of equipment is not creditable.48
Similarly, purchasers of domestically produced integrated
circuits (semiconductors) receive a 14% rebate so that the
effective VAT rate is 3%.49 The same VAT rebate policy
applies to semiconductors that are designed domestically
but made abroad.50

–

4.3. Income tax policy

45. For a recent reduction in the export refund rates, see “Ministry of Finance
and State Administration of Taxation on Adjusting Export Refund Rates”, Cai
Shui [2003] No. 222. For earlier rounds of adjustments, see Lam, Calvin and
Brendan Kelly, “Strategy Counts for Exporters Depending on VAT Refunds”,
Tax Notes International, 29 October 2001, at 438.
46. For comments by Chinese scholars, see Chen, Hongwei, “Another Discussion on Export Refund”, [2004] International Taxation in China, No. 8 at 18;
and Yang, Bin, “An Analysis of the Nature of Economic Globalization and Tax
Policy Options”, id. at 8 (both in Chinese).
47. SAT, “Notice on Improving Measures for the Implementation of ImportReplacement of Steel”, Guo Shui Fa [1999] No. 68, 16 April 1999; Cai Shui Zi
[1998] No. 117 (announcing a subsidy to domestic producers that use domestic
cotton to manufacture products for export).
48. SAT, “Notice on the Trial Measures for the Administration of Tax Refunds
to Foreign-Investment Enterprises Purchasing Chinese-Made Equipment”, Guo
Shui Fa [1999] No. 171, 20 September 1999; Ministry of Finance and SAT,
“Circular on Enterprise Income Tax Credit for Purchasing Chinese-Made Equipment by Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises”, Cai Shui
Zi [2000] No. 049, 1 January 2000.
49. As discussed in 5.2., the VAT refund policy was the subject of a WTO
complaint filed by the United States against China (see note 55, infra). In its
complaint, the United States listed the following documents that authorize
the preferential tax treatment of domestically produced or designed semiconductors: (1) Notice of the State Council Regarding Issuance of Certain Policies
Concerning the Development of the Software Industry and Integrated Circuit
Industry, 24 June 2000; (2) Notice of the Ministry of Finance, State Administration of Taxation and General Administration of Customs on Relevant Tax Policy Issues Concerning Encouraging the Development of the Software Industry
and the Integrated Circuit Industry, 22 September 2000; (3) Notice of the Ministry of Information Industry Regarding Issuance of Regulations on Certification
of Integrated Circuit Design Enterprises and Products, 7 March 2002; (4) Notice
of the Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation Regarding Furthering Tax Policies to Encourage the Development of the Software Industry and
Integrated Circuit Industry, 10 October 2002; (5) Notice of the Ministry of
Finance and State Administration of Taxation Regarding Tax Policies for
Imports of Integrated Circuit Products Domestically Designed and Fabricated
Abroad, 25 October 2002; and (6) Notice of the State Administration of Taxation Regarding Issuance of the Catalogue of Integrated Circuit Products Enjoying Preferential Tax (First Batch), 23 December 2003.
50. See the documents cited in note 49, supra.
51. For an overview of China’s international tax system, see Li, supra note 40,
Chap. 4; and Chapter on China, in Taxes and Investment in Asia and the Pacific
(Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, loose-leaf).
52. Other special areas include open coastal economic zones (OCEZs); economic technological development zones (ETDZs); old urban districts of cities
where SEZs or ETDZs are located; high-tech and new technology zones
(HNTZs); coastal open cities; coastal open areas; capital cities of interior
provinces; open cities along the Yangtze River (open areas); Suzhou Industrial
Park; open cities and townships in border areas; tourist resort zones (TRZs);
bonded areas; and remote/economically underdeveloped areas. For a general
discussion of tax incentives, see Easson, supra note 9.

Enterprises in China are subject to the FEIT or the DEIT
(see 4.1.). The former tax is levied on enterprises with foreign investment (foreign-investment enterprises or FIEs)
and foreign enterprises; the latter is imposed on other
(domestic) enterprises.
FIEs are generally enterprises that are registered in China
and have foreign investment. They include enterprises
jointly owned by Chinese and foreign investors and enterprises that are wholly owned by foreign investors (often
Chinese subsidiaries of a multinational enterprise). FIEs
are taxed as residents of China and are subject to Chinese
tax on their worldwide income. Foreign enterprises are
enterprises that are not registered or incorporated in China.
They are taxed as non-residents and are subject to the
FEIT only on their business and investment income from
Chinese sources.51
Under the FEIT Law, the combined national and local tax
rate is 33%; of this, 30% is the national tax and 3% the
local tax. Many tax incentives are granted by the FEIT
Law so that the effective tax rate under it is much lower
than 33%. The FEIT Law is in contrast to the DEIT Law,
which contains fewer tax incentives. The main tax incentives are summarized below.
(a) Tax holidays. Under the FEIT Law, a tax holiday is
available to new FIEs that are engaged in productive activities. The standard period of the tax holiday is five years,
consisting of a tax exemption for two years and a 50%
reduction in the tax rate for three years. For certain infrastructure projects, however, the tax holiday is ten years.
These tax holidays are not granted on the condition of
export performance.
(b) Incentives for special areas. There are numerous types
of special zones or areas; the earliest and most well known
is the special economic zone (SEZ).52 The tax incentives
take the form of rate reductions and longer tax holidays.
For example, for enterprises established in an SEZ, the
incentives include:

an income tax rate of 15% for newly established enterprises engaged in production and business operations;
– an income tax rate of 24% for productive enterprises
established in the old areas of the cities where SEZs
are located;
– an income tax rate of 15% for enterprises that invest in
technology-intensive projects, projects that have foreign investment of more than USD 30 million with a
long payback period, and projects in sectors encouraged by the state, such as energy and transportation;
and
– an income tax exemption for the first year and a 50%
tax rate reduction for the second and third years (upon
application and subject to the approval of the local tax
authorities) for enterprises in the service sectors with
foreign investment of more than USD 5 million and a
period of operation exceeding ten years.
(c) Reduced rates for export-oriented enterprises. An FIE
is an export-oriented enterprise if, in any year, the value of
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its exports constitutes 70% or more of its total output value
for that year. This status is determined on an annual basis.
In addition to the standard tax holidays, an export-oriented
enterprise may, after expiration of the tax holidays, be
granted a 50% reduction in the applicable tax rate, resulting in a rate of 15% if no other tax concession is available.
For export-oriented enterprises established in an SEZ or
ETDZ (economic technological development zone) and
for other enterprises that already pay tax at the rate of
15%, the applicable rate is reduced to 10%. There is no
time limit – the tax reduction applies as long as the enterprise qualifies as an export-oriented enterprise.
(d) Reinvestment refund. A tax refund is available to a foreign investor in an FIE if the investor reinvests the profits
derived from the FIE in China for at least five years. The
standard refund rate is 40%. A full refund is allowed if the
profits are reinvested for establishing or expanding an
export-oriented or technologically advanced enterprise.
(e) Incentives for domestic enterprises. The tax incentives
for domestic enterprises are limited. For example, tax
reductions or exemptions may be granted to:
– domestic enterprises that utilize waste gas, waste
water and solid waste as major production inputs;
– newly established enterprises in remote regions,
poverty-stricken regions or regions with ethnic
groups;
– enterprises that derive income from transferring technologies or from related services such as technology
consultancy or training;
– enterprises that suffer from disasters such as fire,
flood, tornado or earthquake; and
– newly established township enterprises that create a
significant number of new jobs (e.g. if the new jobs
created in a certain year exceed 60% of the total jobs.
China’s current tax system was designed before China
became a member of the WTO. China’s main policy objectives were to raise revenue and stimulate the economy
by encouraging exports and foreign direct investment.
Little emphasis was placed on tax equity or neutrality. An
examination of these policies in light of the WTO principles reveals various inconsistencies. In its accession
negotiations with the WTO member countries, China
promised to follow the WTO principles and remove any
inconsistent tax measures. As discussed below, the WTO
constraints on China’s tax policy go beyond mere
promises, but to what extent?
5. WTO CONSTRAINTS ON CHINA’S TAX
POLICY
This part discusses the WTO constraints on China’s tax
policy. The constraints may be demonstrated by (a) the
commitments made by China in its WTO accession negotiations, (b) the change in China’s VAT rebate policy to
settle a trade dispute with the United States, and (c) possible reform of the export subsidies in anticipation of
WTO challenges. This part also explores the extent of
these constraints in light of the limitations of the WTO
rules and the enforcement mechanism.
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5.1. China’s “promises”
During the accession negotiations, members of the Working Party on China’s accession to the WTO expressed concern that certain of China’s tax policies were not in conformity with the WTO rules. The Report of the Working
Party on the Accession of China (Report) noted that certain internal taxes imposed on imports violated the
national treatment principle; that the tax subsidies in connection with SEZs and other special economic areas
appear to be contingent upon export performance or upon
the use of domestic goods and are thus inconsistent with
Art. 3.1 of the SCM Agreement (Report, Para. 174); and
that other tax incentives may also be prohibited export
subsidies under Art. 3.1 of the SCM Agreement (Report,
Para. 166).53 In response, China confirmed that it would
ensure that its tax laws are in full conformity with the
WTO rules upon accession to the WTO (Report, Paras.
105 and 106).
In preparation of China’s accession to the WTO, Chinese
tax officials indicated that the tax measures which are
inconsistent with the WTO principles would be revised;
that the tax measures which are not clearly in violation of
the WTO principles may be adjusted at the request of specific WTO members; and that the FEIT and the DEIT
would be consolidated to implement the national treatment
principle.54
5.2. The semiconductor case against China
China’s commitment to be WTO-compliant was recently
tested in a dispute with the United States. On 18 March
2004, the United States filed a complaint with the WTO55
claiming that China’s VAT treatment of integrated circuits
(semiconductors) was discriminatory and in breach of the
national treatment principle. This was the first complaint
against China since China’s accession to the WTO. It followed criticism by Democratic presidential candidate Senator John Kerry that President Bush’s administration had
not done enough to enforce the commitments China made

53. China had provided a list of prohibited subsidies falling within the scope of
Art. 3 of the SCM Agreement and a timetable for their elimination; see Report of
the Working Party on the Accession of China, supra note 10.
54. “Interview with SAT Officials on the Issue of Tax Policy Adjustment and
Accession to the WTO”, People’s Daily, 6 April 2000, at 2 (overseas edition, in
Chinese). China’s accession to the WTO has significant impact on the way the
Chinese government conducts its business. In the area of taxation, taxpayers
have increased their demand for transparency in tax administration, especially in
respect of obtaining up-to-date tax-related information. The SAT announced in
May 2002 that it would publish an official gazette with all tax-related laws,
regulations, administrative guidelines, tax policies and key speeches. Organizations, enterprises, non-profit organizations, individuals and other interested parties can subscribe to the gazette for an annual cost of CNY 72 (less than
USD 10). The SAT has also improved its web site: www.chinatax.gov.cn. The
web site contains: “Information Channel” (news items and important speeches),
“Tax Laws and Regulations” (text of major tax laws and regulations), “Statistics” and “About the SAT” (organizational structure, the SAT’s functions, and
introduction of SAT officials).
55. WTO, China – Value Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, circulating the
complaint filed by the United States against China; WT/DS309/1, G/L/675,
S/L/160, 23 March 2004 (04-1280). See www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
distabase_wto_members1_e.htm. The European Union, Japan, Mexico and Taiwan requested to join the consultations.
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when it was admitted to the trade body.56 In a prepared
statement, US Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick
said: “China must live up to its WTO obligations; it cannot
impose measures that discriminate against U.S. products.
... The bottom line is that China is discriminating against
key U.S. technology products, it’s wrong, and it’s time to
pursue a remedy through the WTO.”57
The dispute centred on China’s policy of levying a 17%
VAT on semiconductors but refunding up to 14% VAT to
companies that design and make semiconductor chips in
China, while collecting the entire VAT on imported chips.
Semiconductors are one of the United States’ leading
exports to China. China claimed that the VAT rebate policy had not brought substantial financial benefits to
domestic producers and that, in 2003, China imported
more than 80% of its semiconductors, most of which were
from the United States.58 Moreover, it was reported that
some of the main beneficiaries of the rebate policy were
US semiconductor manufacturers that outsource their production to China and US consumers who purchase the
Chinese-made products at lower prices.59
The two sides entered into consultations in the summer.
After four rounds of negotiations, an agreement was
reached and a memorandum of understanding was signed
in Geneva on 14 July 2004. China agreed to stop certifying
new semiconductor products and manufacturers for the
VAT refunds and to stop providing the refunds to the current beneficiaries by 1 April 2005. China also promised to
terminate the tax refund for semiconductors that are
designed locally, produced abroad and then imported into
China. In turn, the United States withdrew its complaint to
the WTO.
On 31 August 2004, the Ministry of Finance and the State
Administration of Taxation jointly issued a circular entitled “Termination of the VAT Refund Policy on the
Import of Domestically Designed and Foreign-Produced
Semiconductors” (Cai Guan Shui [2004] No. 40). According to the circular, as of 1 October 2004, all imported
semiconductors would be subject to the standard VAT rate
of 17%. This is the first situation where China changed its
tax policy in response to a WTO challenge. As noted in the
report on China’s accession, other tax policies are susceptible to WTO challenges, especially the policies that may
constitute prohibited export subsidies.
5.3. Export subsidies
As mentioned above, some members of the Working Party
on China’s accession to the WTO considered that some of
China’s tax measures probably constitute prohibited
export subsidies. The main measures in this group include:
– the VAT rebates on exports;
– the income tax incentives for export-oriented enterprises;
– the income tax incentives in special areas; and
– the general income tax holidays and other incentives.
The VAT rebates on exports are generally not prohibited
export subsidies. It is an international practice to apply a
zero rate of VAT to exports, thereby resulting in a refund
of the VAT paid on business inputs. The theoretical justifi-
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cation for export rebates is the destination principle:
exports are relieved from VAT in the country of origin
(exporting country) and imports are subject to VAT in the
country of destination (importing country). Because it is
reasonable to assume that goods and services are consumed at the place of destination, VAT is appropriately
levied at the VAT rate in the country of destination.60 VAT
export rebates ensure that cross-border trade is free from
double taxation under the VAT system. Both the GATT
1947 and the SCM Agreement recognize this and do not
consider VAT export rebates as export subsidies so long as
the amount of the rebate does not exceed the VAT actually
paid on the exported goods (Annex I (Illustrative list of
export subsidies) of the SCM Agreement).
China’s VAT export rebate policy deviates from the international norm: the export rebate rates are prescribed by the
government and are often different from the nominal VAT
rates applicable to business inputs. If the rebate rate is
higher than the VAT actually paid, this may violate Art. 3.1
of the SCM Agreement. On the other hand, in most cases,
since the rebate rate is lower than the nominal VAT rate,
China’s VAT export rebates are not export subsidies.61
The tax incentives for export-oriented enterprises are
clearly prohibited export subsidies: they involve foregone
revenue (i.e. tax reductions), are specific to certain taxpayers (i.e. FIEs), and are “in law” contingent upon export
performance (an FIE must export at least 70% of its products to qualify for the tax incentive).
The income tax holidays and the tax incentives for FIEs in
special areas pose some analytical problems. Chinese law
does not specify “export” as a condition for the incentives.
In fact, however, many FIEs export their products to earn
foreign currency. China still has exchange controls and its
currency is not freely convertible. FIEs must find their
own way to balance their foreign currency expenditures
and earnings. Exporting products is a necessity for many
FIEs. Therefore, the tax holidays and tax reductions that
are available to all FIEs, whether or not they export their
products, could in effect “subsidize” the exports of FIEs.
Because there is no express link between the tax incentives
and exports, however, a challenge to these measures as
export subsidies is unlikely to succeed. As explained in
footnote 4 of the SCM Agreement, “the mere fact that a
subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall not for
that reason alone be considered to be an export subsidy
within the meaning of this provision”.
Overall, the WTO principles impose certain constraints on
China’s tax policy. As a result of the semiconductor case,
56. “U.S. Launches WTO Complaint against China”, China Daily, 19 March
2004.
57. “U.S. Files First WTO Case Against China, Citing Discriminatory Tax Policy on Chips”, 21 International Trade Reporter, No. 13 at 532 (25 March 2004).
58. Id.
59. “Agreement ends rebates for chip makers”, China Economic Net, at
en.ce.cn/Industries/Basic-industries/t20040327_546277.shtml (visited on 17
September 2004).
60. See Doernberg, Richard, et al., Mulijurisdictional Taxation of Electronic
Commerce (2001), Chap. 3.
61. Hu, Xueqin, “Adjusting Export Tax Rebate Policy and Constructing a
Neutral Tax Refund System”, [2004] International Taxation in China, No. 8
at 14 (in Chinese).
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China terminated its VAT rebate policy as requested by the
United States. This means that China may not “freely” use
the VAT incentives to promote the domestic production of
semiconductors. Similar VAT incentives may be withdrawn with or without a WTO complaint.62 The income
tax incentives granted to export-oriented enterprises and
other types of FIEs may also be challenged under the
WTO rules. Nevertheless, for the reasons explained below,
the level of the WTO constraints on China’s tax policy
may be very modest.
5.4. Limitations of the WTO constraints
The WTO system, as important as it is in regulating international trade, has limitations in respect of its impact on
domestic tax policy. These limitations may be found in the
WTO rules, the dispute settlement process and the
enforcement mechanism.
The WTO rules are limited in that they do not explicitly
apply to tax policies aimed at attracting foreign direct
investment. The realm of trade law and the realm of tax
policy do not overlap outside the area of tax subsidies.63
China is perfectly free to determine its tax mix and the
structure and rate(s) of each tax. Even in the area of tax
subsidies, the WTO principles do not seem to prohibit
China from using tax subsidies, especially income tax
measures that do not specifically require export as a condition for the subsidies.
The WTO rules are also limited in that they distinguish
between VAT/indirect taxes and income taxes. In economic terms, subsidies are fungible: a VAT rebate and an
income tax reduction could be designed to produce the
same economic benefit to taxpayers.64 Under the WTO
rules, however, VAT export rebates are not prohibited
export subsidies, but an income tax refund is. For example, Annex I (Illustrative list of export subsidies) of the
SCM Agreement includes:
(h) The exemption, remission or deferral of prior-stage
cumulative indirect taxes on goods or services used in the
production of exported products in excess of the exemption,
remission or deferral of like prior-stage cumulative indirect
taxes on goods or services used in the production of like
products when sold for domestic consumption; provided,
however, that prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes may be
exempted, remitted or deferred on exported products even
when not exempted, remitted or deferred on like products
when sold for domestic consumption, if the prior-stage
cumulative indirect taxes are levied on inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product (making
normal allowance for waste).

Therefore, as long as the VAT export rebate does not
exceed the VAT levied on business inputs, the rebate is not
a prohibited export subsidy. At present, VAT is the most
important tax in China. Because the export rebate rates are
generally below the nominal VAT rate, China can boost its
exports by simply allowing a full VAT rebate for exports
without violating the WTO rules.
Even if some of the income tax incentives are potentially
prohibited export subsidies, it is questionable whether a
country would file a complaint against China. The SCM
Agreement sets out the procedural requirements that must
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be observed in countervailing duty actions. For example,
Art. 11 provides that “an investigation to determine the
existence, degree and effect of any alleged subsidy shall be
initiated upon a written application by or on behalf of the
domestic industry”. The application must include sufficient evidence not only of the existence of a subsidy and,
if possible, the amount, but also of the injury to the domestic industry. In a dispute such as that between the European
Union and the United States concerning the US FSC
regime, the injured party is able to quantify the damage it
claims to have suffered and is in a position to take retaliatory action.65 In the case of the Chinese income tax
incentives designed to attract foreign investment, it is difficult to imagine a WTO member country that could quantify the damage resulting from China’s tax policy and be in
a position to retaliate against China. The countries that
could be injured are probably other developing countries
since they compete with China in attracting foreign direct
investment. These countries either do not have a sufficiently significant level of trade with China to impose
effective trade sanctions against China, or they offer similar tax incentives and are thus not in a position to file a
complaint.66 Developed countries whose investors are
attracted to invest in China would probably have difficulty
proving an “injury” to a specific domestic industry.67
Workers in these countries tend to suffer most of the economic “damage” as a result of the disappearance of job
opportunities, but as consumers, they benefit from the
lower prices of goods imported from China. In any event,
trade unions and consumer groups have no standing under
the DSU rules.
The enforcement mechanism of WTO decisions has its
own limitations. Enforcement of the WTO rules is mainly
a bilateral exercise.68 As such, it depends largely on the
internal political and economic situation of the country
that must change its laws to comply with the WTO rulings.
Prompt enforcement is more likely where the economic
stake is high and the political cost is dear (as in the semiconductor case, see 5.2.). According to a study of the
WTO cases lost by the United States as a defendant, the
impact of the lost cases on domestic policy “is quite minimal”.69 The US FSC case is the only “punch to the gut”
type case: it is more important economically (over USD 4
billion per year) and could potentially trigger significant
changes to US tax law. Other cases are merely a “poke in
the eye” type or less serious.70 China is certainly not the
United States and may react quite differently to adverse
62. The United States has also taken notice of China’s VAT exemption for fertilizer that is primarily domestically produced. See US Trade Representative,
2003 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, 11 December 2003.
63. McDaniel, supra note 7, at 1638-1639.
64. Slemrod, Joel, “Free Trade Taxation and Protectionist Taxation”, 2 International Tax & Public Finance 471 (1995) (while theoretically it is possible to
design tax rules that have the same effect as tariffs, in practice that is difficult to
achieve).
65. According to the WTO report cited in note 5, supra, the EU is authorized to
use countermeasures in the amount of USD 4,043 million, which may take the
form of tariffs raised up to 100% on US imports.
66. Easson, supra note 9, at 207.
67. Id.
68. Pauwelyn, supra note 27, at 335.
69. Schaefer, supra note 26.
70. Id.
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WTO decisions. If for various reasons, China chose not to
amend its domestic law as requested by the Dispute Settlement Body, China would certainly have the United States
as a model.
6. CONCLUSION
This article has used China’s accession to the WTO to
demonstrate the relationship between the WTO rules and
domestic tax policy. Following a discussion of the key
WTO rules and China’s tax policies, the article has identi-
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fied some of the potential suspects of WTO violations. The
article has also demonstrated that the WTO rules have certain impact on China’s tax policy. For example, China has
terminated the tax subsidies that discriminate against foreign products, and certain export subsidies are currently
under review and will likely be removed in the forthcoming comprehensive tax reform. Overall, however, owing to
the limitations in the WTO rules and the dispute settlement
process, the impact of WTO membership has been and
will continue to be modest. China maintains more or less
the same level of control over its tax policies after its
accession to the WTO as it did before.
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